A model and procedure are proposed to help design and position products which are characterized by a high level of consistency between product preference and purchase behavior. The procedure is based on utility theoretic concepts for assessing preference and inferring probable behavior. A numetical example is included.
The methodology suggested is designed to be used for precisely those situations in which little data (of a repeat-purchase variety) are likely to be available, but where the customers (individuals or firms) purchase consistently with stated or inferred preferences.
The approach is based on utility theory (see Raiffa [ll] for a discussion of the basic concepts of utility theory). It assumes customers have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over the product variables --that is, customers are expected utility maximizers and "act as they should." Utility theory has been used in the past mainly in a normative or prescriptive sense --telling decision makers what they should do in given circumstances. The market situations considered here are, by definition, those in which individuals do what they should.
Hauser and Urban [61 have developed a structure for models of choice between finite alternatives. Their structure of the analytical process of choice includes: (1) observation of behavior and measurement; (2) reduction and abstraction --reducing the number of product dimensions to a few, "independent" ones and labelling them; (3) compaction, developing brand preference measures; (4) probability of choice, relating preference to purchase behavior, and (5) aggregation, transforming probability of purchase measures to market share measures.
The methods developed here suggest augmenting the observation step, by measuring attitudes in face-to-face interviews, through methods of direct utility function assessment as in [l] , [ e l , [9] . The compaction operation then uses utility theory and the assumption of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function obviates the probability-ofchoice step. Aggregation is performed by taking explicit account of consumer heterogeneity throughout the procedure.
This procedure would be useful in industrial purchasing situations where the purchasing agent or a suitable surrogate could be isolated which has both explicit purchase criteria and bargaining power. The purchase of graded goods (raw materials, fabricated materials, and supplies) would be a cornmon example.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the formal structure of the model and introduces notation. Section 2 develops a general framework of analysis which is applied to a simple, hypothetical example in Section 3.
I. THE MODEL AND T'IOTATION
Consider a well-defined product class in 1 7 firms Fl, ..., Fn in a single, specific market. Let mi be the market share of Fi, and assume that each firm makes a single product.
Let the set of attributes XI, X2, ... completely characterize a product, where X1 could be price, X2 could be reliability ratings, etc. These attributes would be attained by factor analysis of a series of well-defined product ratings or perhaps non-metric scaling procedures, given a set of similarity judgments. Both methods have proven effective through neither has established "superiority." (Green, [ 3 ] ) The output of these procedures, then, would be a reduced set of product characteristics, Xl, ..., Xr A specific level of X is x so a product j j is completely described by x = (xl, ..., xj). The product of firm Fi i will be denoted by xi = (xl , . . . , xji). A no-product purchase 5° = 0 0 (xl , ..., xJ ) could be included for completeness.
Customers will be designated by C1, ..., CK. It will be assumed that each customer Ck has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uk(x/X), where Ck's utility function is specified by the set of parameters = (Al, ..., h R ) . Assuming each customer buys a product, utili theory suggests he should buy the product of firm Fi such that his utility is maximized.
Since viewing the problem from the firm's point of view will require the same methodology regardless of the specific firm. let us take the viewpoint of firm F1. Firm Fl has certain objectives which could include maximizing market share, maximizing profit, and so on. We postulate that the objective function of F1 is also specified by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function vl over market share ml, profit and/or other variables.
There are uncertainties here for both firms and customers. The firm wants to know utility functions for all customers in the market. This information about customer heterogeneity will be expressed in the form of a probability distribution PA(X) over the parameters A describ--ing a randomly selected cu~tomer'~s utility function. Thus, customers' utility functions are likely to differ so does not take on a single value, but, rather, is expressed as a probability distribution. Any firm will not have perfect knowledge about the "true" PA(i) and will, in general, attempt to estimate the distribution, entailing some error. Thus, we might consider parameterizing the distribution to uive 4 PA,e(A-/i) where 2 = !el,..., BT) indicates the uncertainties of Fl about the true A. We quantify that uncertainty by the probability distribution Pg ( 2 ) .
Consumers in general will differ their knowledge or attitude about the characteristics gA of firm Fits product. From F, 's per-A spective, this heterogeneity can be described by the parameterized probability distributions P : 1. An objective function vl, which is a utility function, known with certainty.
2.
A distribution of utility functions uk(x_/&) which vary across the heterogeneous customer population quantified by PA/e(h/g). The probability distribution Pg(g) quantifies this uncertainty.
3.
A set of distributions of product-perceptions, pxi , i=1, ..., N, also varying across the heterogeneous customerpopulation. The probability distribution P (9) quantifies @ this uncertainty.
2.

GENERAL MODEL STRUCTURE
In this section, we first consider the decision an individual consumer must make and how his decisions are inputs to the decision-making processes of the firm. Then we focus on how firms can use the model for product positioning decisions.
Consumer Decisions
The consumer must decide which if any of the products in the market to buy given that he will buy at most one. Thus we explicitly consider the case of a consumer m & purchasing any product. Another possibility would have been to define consumers as those who will buy one product and then formally include uncertainty about the number of consumers in the market.
Our model does not explicitly include individual consumer uncertainty about product characteristic~. Rather, Fi is uncertain both about the set of consumer utility functions and the set of consumer product perceptions. Explicit inclusion of consumer uncertainty would needlessly complicate the problem. We will assume that Ck has a utility function uk(x) and his choices are not to buy a product and receive or to buy the product of Fi and receive xl, i=1,2,. . .H. He will choose the option x* giving him the highest utility where x* is defined by
In the case of uncertainty, the consumer should choose the product of firm F . which maximizes his expected utility. 
Firm Decisions Under Certainty
Under certainty, firm F1 should maximize its market utility vl. Here we assume the distribution of utility functions is known and that customers do not vary in their perception of brand characteristics (that is 2 and i-1, 2,. . . ,M, are known). The condition of cer--tainty could be used as a first cut, as less information is required here to attain a product design decision. Firm F, has a product with Suppose Fl is considering changing its product position from to 1 x . Then a new ml can be determined exactly as ml was using (2) and
Suppose a new firm with utility function trying to enter a volume inelastic market with a maximum profit product ( 5 ) ; that is,
where s is unit product sellino price, C is the unit cost of the product (x), G is the market volume.
m is its market share, and d(5) is the fixed development cost (plant, R&D, etc.) associated with ( 5 ) . Then v is the profit associated with the new product. There will likely be a set Q of alternate product positions, generically denoted by x, that the new firm could attain.
Given the existing products in the market, for each possible 1! there is a set A ( 5 ) (perhaps null) defined by
The best decision for this firm is to choose 2 in Q to maximize where the first term in brackets in (5) represents the market share of product ( 5 ) and v(x_) is the profit associated with the product. Under "nice" conditions it may be possible to simply differentiate v ( 5 ) with respect to 5 to determine the product position to maximize profit.
Firm Decisions Under Uncertainty
The problems under uncertainty are parallel but more complicated than those with certainty. The W o sources of uncertainty are the firms' imperfect knowledge about preference (or utility) heterogeneity, characterized by 5 , and imperfedt knowledge about perceptual heterogeneity, characterized by el, i=O, 1.. . . .N.
we will assume here, for simplicity, that perceptual heterogeneity and utility heterogenity are independent within individuals. should choose 5 to maximize its expected utility, given by
where P e t P describe the uncertainty in F l f s measure of consumer's 0 preferences and perceptions respectively.
.
A SIMPLE EXAI4PLE (PRICE Il?,PUTED QU?.LITY)
A number of authors (see Rao and Shakun [12] , Gabor and Granger [ 2 ] , Kamen and Toman [71 have suggested that, in certain product classes which offer nearly indistinguishable products, (such as gasoline, packaged soaps, etc.) price, as an indicator of quality (and perhaps value) is the most important, if not sole determinant of purchase behavior. Without delving into this subject we offer the following simple example in which a single product-characteristic (say, price) distinguishes market products. Thus, the product characteristics are described by the single attribute X (price) and A , 8 , @i, for all i, are univariate-The general problem is tractable with aid of a computer, perhaps through simulation, if necessary, but a more complex computer, perhaps through simulation, if necessary, but a more complex example here would obscure the basic ideas of the method.
Let the set of utility functions of the consumers be where x is a price for the product and suppose the "true" distribution of X among consumers is quantified by There are three firms FL, F 2 , and F3 and the consumers are heterogeneous in their perceptions of prices xl, x 2 , and x3 as follows:
That is, the P; are normal distributions with means @ 2 , and 4 3 respectively and unit variances ( s e e Gabor and Granger 12) for empirical justification using xi = log price).
. 1 Consumer D e c i s i o n s Given t h e u n c e r t a i n t y encoded by (121, t h e expected u t i l i t y of p r o d u c t xi t o consumer
L e t u s assume t h a t $il = 2, m2 = 3, and m3 = 5. 
. 3
Firm D e c i s i o n s u n d e r U n c e r t a i n t y R e t u r n now t o t h e t h r e e f i r m s w i t h t h r e e p r o d u c t s d e s c r i b e d by ( 1 2 ) and s u p p o s e t h e c l a s s o f consumer u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s i s g i v e n by ( 1 0 ) . Suppose t h a t F i r m F1, whose p o i n t o f view w e w i l l t a k e , f e e l s but d u e t o t h e l a c k o f a v a i l a b l e d a t a , t h e f i r m ' s m a r k e t research team f e e l s t h e r e i s some u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e t r u e 8 , which i s c h a r a c t e ri z e d by s u p p o s e t h a t x 2 i s t h e " s t a n d a r d p r o d u c t ' i n t h e market t h a t e v e r y o n e knows w e l l and 192 = 3 . Our own p r o d u c t x1 and t h e c o m p e t i t o r ' s x 3 are newer so they are subject to more consumer variability. S O let 1 @ be uniformly distributed from 1 to 3 and let $ 3 be uniformly distributed from 4 to 6. If these perceptions are independent, we have ~t is easy to see that, as before 0' < @ 2 < 4 3 so analogous t o (15), Hence to calculate the probability distribution ml for F1, we just calculate the probability A < 4' t @2. Note that the distribution bf 'max 'min 2 1 1 a < ml < 5 , the probability ml < m equals + P ( B < m). ~ntegrating over the appropriate regions of Figure 1 , we get the cumulative probability distribution for ml which is differentiated to yield This probability distribution is shown in Figure 2 . The expected market share is given by
If firm F l t s preferences are qqantified with the utility function v1 over various market share levels, then one can simply use the probability distribution Pm (m) and vl(m) to calculate the expected 1 utility. Given a choice among options whose impacts are quantified by probability distributions over market share, firm Fl should calculate the respective expected utilities and choose the option associated with the highest. 
MODEL STATUS AND USE
For a firm to utilize such a model, it would need to assess its utility function v and select parametric models for the population utility functions uk(x/X), their heterogeneity of preference . . . tt,
